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In the 1960s, three types of matching mechanisms were adopted in regional entry-level
British medical labor markets to prevent unraveling of contract dates. One of these categories
of matching mechanisms failed to prevent unraveling. Roth (1991) showed the instability
of that failing category. One of the surviving categories was unstable as well, and Roth
concluded that features of the environments of these mechanisms are responsible for their
survival. However, ￿nver (2001) demonstrated that the successful yet unstable mechanisms
performed better in preventing unraveling than the unsuccessful and unstable category in
an arti￿cial-adaptive-agent-based economy. In this paper, we conduct a human subject
experiment in addition to short- and long-run arti￿cial agent simulations to understand this
puzzle. We ￿nd that both the unsuccessful and unstable mechanism and the successful
and unstable mechanism perform poorly in preventing unraveling in the experiment and in
short-run simulations, while long-run simulations support the previous ￿nver ￿nding.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Occasionally early contracts or unraveling of contract dates result in ex-post ineﬃciencies in
entry-level labor matching markets. Without changing the rules of the market, it may be im-
possible to eradicate harmful unraveling. The evolution of the entry-level British labor markets
for medical interns and hospitals provides a unique natural experiment in reorganization as an
attempt to prevent the unraveling of contract dates (Roth 1991). At the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, the British labor market for medical interns and hospitals was decentralized. This
organization led to the unraveling of contract dates. Consultants, the supervising physicians
and surgeons who manage hospital positions, started oﬀering positions to the intern candidates
almost two years in advance of their graduation from medical school. These created ineﬃcien-
cies: there were often mismatches as a result of losses in planning ￿exibility and lack of proper
information at the time of the early match. Therefore, regional health service oﬃcials decided
to employ centralized matching clearinghouses. They employed three major types of matching
mechanisms in diﬀerent regions of the country.
A matching mechanism is a systematic procedure that matches interns with consultants
according to their revealed ordinal preferences over each other. A matching is ￿unstable￿ if there
is a consultant-intern pair each of whom prefers the other to her match or if the matching is
individually irrational. A mechanism is ￿unstable￿ if it produces at least one unstable matching
for some preference pro￿le.1
Roth (1991) shows that two of these three categories, priority matching mechanisms and
linear programming mechanisms, are ￿unstable,￿ while the third category is a version of the
Gale-Shapley (1962) mechanisms. In the ￿eld, it appeared that the ￿unstable￿ priority matching
mechanisms were ￿unsuccessful￿ and were abandoned, since interns and consultants continued
signing contracts up to two years in advance of graduation of interns.2
Although instability appeared as the explanation of the failure in several studies,3 the ￿un-
stable￿ linear programming mechanisms nevertheless stood as a ￿successful￿ category. This
c a t e g o r yo fm e c h a n i s m si ss t i l lb e i n gu s e di nB r i tain. This anomaly presents a challenge to the
￿stability￿ hypothesis as an explanation of the ￿eld success of matching mechanisms. The linear
programming mechanisms have been used in the ￿eld for almost 30 years. The markets in which
1Entry-level labor markets have been studied theoretically in the two-sided matching framework (See Roth and
Sotomayor 1990 for theoretical background and motivation) through the marriage and assignment models. There
is a recent interest for analyzing unraveling in game theoretical settings, for example see Roth and Xing 1994,
S￿nmez 1999, Kesten 2003 and Niederle, Roth, and ￿nver 2004. Also, Li and Rosen (1998) initiated a literature
that analyzes unraveling in competitive environments.
2See Ehlers 2002 for game theoretical properties of British two-sided matching mechanisms under incomplete
information.
3For example, see Roth 1984, 1991, Roth and Xing 1994, Kagel and Roth 2000.
2the linear programming mechanisms were introduced are the two smallest markets in Britain.
Consultants and graduating medical students know each other very well. On the other hand,
the markets in which priority matching mechanisms were used are much larger. Roth (1991)
comments on the survival of the linear programming mechanisms as follows:
One hypothesis is that the environments in which the [linear programming] mar-
kets are conducted diﬀer signi￿cantly from other environments: each of these two
[linear programming] schemes is for the graduates of a single medical school, on the
small end of the markets considered here. Thus, there may be social and other kinds
of pressures that make it diﬃcult to circumvent the formal matching.
As an alternative to the Roth hypothesis, we propose a hypothesis related to the mechanism
characteristics of the linear programming markets as follows: It is easy to adjust to a linear
programming matching system; by manipulating their rank-order lists, agents obtain almost
stable outcomes and do not unravel the mechanism. A previous study, ￿nver 2001, ￿nds evidence
in support of this hypothesis by showing that computational adaptive agents can evolve to adjust
themselves to the linear programming mechanisms in the long run.4 It prevents unraveling
through adaptation and manipulative strategic behavior. That study is the only paper in the
literature that investigates the dynamics of the linear programming mechanisms. A ￿eld study,
Mongell and Roth 1991, also ￿nds that this is the case for the unstable matching mechanism
that is successfully used to accept members to American college sororities.
Kagel and Roth 2000 reports a laboratory experiment on matching markets. They observe
in a controlled environment that a priority matching market causes high levels of early matching
(comparable with the decentralized market). However, they observe that a Gale-Shapley mecha-
nism is very successful in decreasing the levels of early matching below those of the decentralized
markets.5
In this paper, we will test mechanism characteristics under a preference and information
structure inspired by the actual British markets. We will use experimental and computational
methods in the analysis. If the linear programming mechanism prevents early matching more
eﬀectively than the priority matching mechanism, this will support the hypothesis that the halt
in unraveling is due to the mechanism itself (i.e., it implements another mechanism that obtains
desirable matches for the participants) and not to the non-anonymous character of the small
markets in which it has been used.
4This means that the arti￿cial agents learn to collectively manipulate the mechanism so as to obtain almost
ex-post stable outcomes in a dynamic environment without making early contracts.
5There is also an emerging literature on matching market experiments. Besides the Kagel and Roth study,
for example Chen and S￿nmez (2002,2003)t e s td i ﬀerent matching mechanisms, and Haruvy, Roth, and ￿nver
(2001), McKinney, Niederle, and Roth (2002), Niederle and Roth (2003), Niederle, Roth, and ￿nver (2004) study
timing of transactions in various matching contexts.
3In addition to human subject experiments, we will also use a computational learning model
to model the behavior of human subjects in the experiment. Static equilibrium analysis gives
very limited insight to the dynamics that govern the subject learning observed in the experiment.
Simulating a learning model makes it possible to obtain insights about subject learning. We
use genetic algorithms for this purpose, since individual learning models used in the literature
cannot handle the modeling of the learning of subjects in complex environments with many
possible strategies (like the games examined here). The importance of this exercise is that it
makes possible the comparison of the results with ￿nver 2001. ￿nver (2001) used long-run
simulation results to draw conclusions about why linear programming mechanisms survived in
the ￿e l di na ne n v i r o n m e n ts i m i l a rt ot h a tu s e di nt his study. In this study, we use short-run
simulation results to show how subjects learn in the laboratory.
The experimental results show that there is no diﬀerence between the linear programming
mechanism and the priority mechanism in terms of preventing unraveling. They both perform
more poorly than the surviving Gale-Shapley mechanism. Short-run arti￿cial agent simulations
support this ￿nding as well. However, long-run simulations yield results consistent with the pre-
vious ￿nver study, demonstrating that in the long-run linear programming mechanisms perform
quite well in preventing unraveling.
2 The British Matching Mechanisms
We have Gale and Shapley￿s (1962) marriage model in mind as the environment where the British
matching mechanisms are used. In this model, a matching market consists of a set of consultants,
a disjoint set of interns, each consultant￿s strict preferences over interns and staying unmatched,
and each intern￿s strict preferences over consultants and staying unmatched. Each consultant
and each intern can be matched with a single partner or remain unmatched. A matching is
a mapping that (i) matches each intern with a consultant or leaves her unmatched and each
consultant with an intern or leaves her unmatched, and (ii) maps an intern to a consultant
if and only if it maps the same consultant to the same intern. A matching mechanism is
a systematic procedure that selects a matching for each matching market. Although various
versions of the mechanisms were used in real life, we chose only one from each category to use
in our experiment. Next, we explain these mechanisms.
2.1 Linear Programming Mechanisms
Two regional hospital systems (London, 1973 and Cambridge, 1978), each involving a single
medical school and its teaching hospital, developed schemes using the optimal assignment model.
The rank-order lists of the interns and the consultants are taken as the input. After weights
4are assigned to these choices, they are summed for each potential consultant-intern pair [f,w]
in a matching and denoted by αf,w.T h a ti s ,αf,w is the sum of f￿s weight of w and w￿s weight
of f. The resulting weights form the basis for an integer programming assignment problem of
matching the interns with the consultants so as to maximize the sum of matches. It is equivalent














xf,w =1 ∀ f
(iii) xf,w ∈ [0,1] ∀ f,w
where xf,w =0means no match between f and w and xf,w =1denotes a proposed match. First,
optimal matrix of ￿proposed matches￿ x is determined by solving the above problem.6 Pair [f,w]
who actually listed each other in their rank-order lists and for whom there is a proposed match
(i.e., xf,w =1 )are matched to each other in the market. Note that even when xf,w =1if
consultant f did not rank intern w or if intern w did not rank consultant f,am a t c hb e t w e e nf
and w is not realized in the version of the mechanism we use in this study.
When intern w lists consultant f in k￿th place in her rank-order list and the same consultant
ranks the intern in l￿th place, such a [f,w] m a t c hi sc a l l e da(k,l) match. In the London linear
programming mechanism, choices 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are given weights of 36, 28, 21, 15, 10, and
6, respectively. Thus, a (1,1) match receives weight αf,w =7 2 , (1,2) and (2,1) matches each
receives weight αf,w =6 4 , and so forth. An unlisted choice is given the negative weight of -100.
We use the London mechanism and these weights in our study.
The linear programming mechanism is unstable. More speci￿cally, the mechanism allows
the existence of a consultant-intern pair each of whom prefers another to her match. Even
(1,1) matches are not guaranteed to be realized under the linear programming mechanism.
Nevertheless, although it is unstable, the linear programming mechanism has survived and is
still being used. Based on a Monte Carlo study, we observe that only 73.05% (std. dev. %41.61)
of all (1,1) lists turn into a match under the linear programming mechanism per market.7
2.2 Priority Matching Mechanisms
The mechanisms introduced in Newcastle (1967) and in two other regions (Birmingham, 1966
and Edinburgh, 1967) assign each match a priority in terms of stated preference rankings of
6Whenever there are multiple candidates for optimal x, one is picked with a uniform random draw.
7I nam a r k e to f6w o r k e r sa n d6￿rms and when the preferences are generated randomly using the partially
correlated preference pro￿l ed e s c r i b e di nal a t e rs e c t i o n .
5the consultants and the interns. In the Newcastle mechanism, the priority of a (k,l) match is
the product of the intern￿s ranking of the consultant and the consultant￿s ranking of the intern
i.e. k ￿ l. After priorities are found, the matches are realized starting from the lowest priority
number.8 We use this mechanism in our study.
A priority matching mechanism is unstable. However, possible (1,1) matches are always
realized in this particular mechanism. This mechanism was abandoned after a few years of trial
in the ￿eld. In Newcastle, 80% of the lists consisted of a single choice. This was an evidence of
early agreements. Similar centralized matching procedures failed and could not ￿x the unraveling
problem that ￿rst appeared during the decentralized matching era.
2.3 Gale-Shapley Mechanisms
Gale-Shapley mechanisms were adopted in Edinburgh (1969) and in one other market (Cardiﬀ,
1971). The Edinburgh (1969) mechanism is a variant of the consultant-optimal Gale-Shapley
mechanism.9 This mechanism has been used successfully for about 30 years. The current
mechanism in some Scottish markets is a variant of the intern-optimal Gale-Shapley mechanism.
The outcome of this mechanism is determined by the following consultant-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm:
At the ￿rst step, each consultant proposes to her most preferred intern. Each intern is
tentatively matched with the best consultant among the pool of consultants who propose to her,
and she rejects all other oﬀers.
At any other step, each consultant who does not have a tentative match from the previous
step proposes to the best intern who has not yet rejected her. Each intern is tentatively matched
with the best consultant among the owners of the proposals at this step and her tentative match
from the previous step, and she rejects all other oﬀers. When no oﬀers are rejected at a step,
the algorithm terminates and tentative matches are realized as matches.
In Cardiﬀ, a version of the intern-optimal Gale-Shapley mechanism was used (the outcome
of this mechanism is determined by the intern-proposing algorithm, dual of the consultant-
proposing algorithm, which is obtained by reversing the roles of the consultants and the interns).
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that deferred acceptance algorithms determine stable match-
ings. Note that pairs with potential (1,1) matches are always realized under stable mechanisms.
In our study, we use the Edinburgh (1969) mechanism.
8In the scheme adopted in Newcastle, in cases of ties in priority numbers, interns￿ preferences are given higher
priority: a (1,4) match is more favorable than a (2,2) match, which is more favorable that a (4,1) match although
all have the priority number 4.
9Its name re￿ects the fact that this mechanism ￿nds the best stable matching for consultants.
63 Experimental Design
Following the chronological organization of the British markets, we use two diﬀerent matching
game designs in the experiment: a decentralized game, which is later replaced with a mixed game.
The second game is called ￿mixed￿ because agents can choose to be matched in a decentralized
manner or in a centralized manner, whereas in the ￿rst game agents can be matched only in a
decentralized manner. Each experimental session consists of 10 consecutive decentralized games
followed by 15 consecutive mixed games.
In the experiment, there are two disjoint sets of subjects: ￿rms (consultants) and workers
(interns).10 Each worker seeks a job at one ￿rm and each ￿rm can hire only one worker. Subjects
belong to one of two types, high productivity or low productivity. They are also chosen to be
￿rms or workers. The set of ￿r m si sd e n o t e da sF and the set of workers is denoted as W.
The types of agents are common knowledge. At the beginning of each session, 6 subjects are
randomly assigned as ￿rms and 6 subjects are randomly assigned as workers. Their types are
randomly determined as well: 3 ￿rms and 3 workers are assigned the high productivity type and
the remaining 3 ￿rms and 3 workers are assigned the low productivity type. Subjects remain
the same type throughout the experiment. The utility function of agent v is denoted by uv.T h e
utility function of ￿rm f is uf : W ∪ {f} → R+, and it is de￿ned for worker w0 as
uf(w0)=σw0 + sf,w0
where random variable sf,w0 is drawn from a discrete cumulative distribution function G with
support [−$1,$1].
The utility function of worker w is uw : F ∪ {w} → R+ and is de￿ned for ￿rm f0 as
uw(f0)=σf0 + sw,f0
where sw,f0 is also distributed with discrete cumulative distribution G. Any agent v remaining
unmatched has utility 0 and this is denoted by uv(v)=0 .
For any agent v, the non-random part in her partner￿s utility function, σv, is determined by
v￿s productivity type as follows:
σv =
(
$5 if v is type low
$15 if v is type high
Marginal distribution G is obtained from a joint discrete uniform distribution in interval
[−$1,$1] (with 5 cent intervals) without permitting any ties in the utility values of an agent
to sustain strict preferences. The utility pro￿les of the experiment are ￿xed throughout the
sessions. 25 utility pro￿les are used, one for each matching market. We determine 15 utility
10We refer to the consultants as ￿￿rms￿ and the interns as ￿workers￿ in the experiment.
7pro￿l e su s e di nt h em i x e dg a m e sa sf o l l o w s :W er a n d o m l yg e n e r a t eau t i l i t yp r o ￿le and use this
in the experiment if it involves at least one mismatch between the high types and the low types
under the linear programming mechanism and the priority matching mechanism. We want to
ensure by doing so that the unstable mechanisms can really produce unstable outcomes when
agents reveal their preferences truthfully.11
By a Monte-Carlo study, we verify that about 39.70% of the random matchings produced
by the priority matching mechanism have at least one mismatched pair. Almost 96.14% of the
time we observe a mismatch under the linear programming mechanism.
The preference structure is similar to that of the British markets where there is usually a
most preferred central hospital with many residency positions and several less preferable smaller
hospitals. Interns participate both with and outside the region, and their academic performance
is known by the consultants so that they can be classi￿ed as good or bad candidates. Speci￿c
features of the interns can cause them to be ranked diﬀerently by each consultant.
Sets {σf} and {σw}, i.e. the types of agents, are common knowledge. For each worker w,
sw,f0 is private information to w.F o r e a c h ￿rm f, sf,w0 is private information to f.T h u s a l l
subjects know each other￿s types, σ values, the support for random s values for other agents,
and the realization of their own s values.
3.1 The Decentralized Game Design
The decentralized game has three periods: in round -2 (that is, round minus two), each ￿rm has
the option to oﬀer a position to at most one worker, and each worker has the option to accept
at most one oﬀer. An accepted oﬀer binds parties for an early match. Round -1 (that is, round
minus one) is a replay of round -2 among those players who did not make any contracts in round
-2. Similarly, round 0 consists of the replay of round -1 among those players who have not made
previous contracts. The rounds diﬀer from each other in the sense that matching in round -2
costs $2, matching in round -1 costs $1, and matching in round 0 does not cost anything. Thus
earlier contracts cost more than later ones.
The structure of the decentralized game is motivated by the decentralized British markets.
Costs to the participants when a market unravels can be caused by several factors, including
uncertainty about the quality of agents and the loss of planning ￿exibility. In this experiment,
all such costs are represented by the dollar cost of matching early. This is an easy but eﬀective
way of incorporating the opportunity costs of unraveling with monetary payoﬀs. The utility of
11The Kagel and Roth (2000) design is somewhat similar to our design, except that the preference pro￿les were
picked by hand to ensure that the priority matching mechanism created at least one mismatched pair, and they
consider only the priority and Gale-Shapley treatments. The number of the mismatched pairs in their design is
￿xed to be higher on average than the number of mismatched pairs in our design under the priority matching
mechanism.
8b e i n gm a t c h e dw i t hah i g ht y p ei nr o u n d0i si nt h ei n t e r v a l[$14,$16], and the utility of being
matched with a low type in round 0 is in the interval [$4,$6]. Moreover matching in round -2
with a high-type agent (which brings at least $12) is better than matching with a low-type agent
in round 0 (which brings at most $6). However, matching to the best high-type choice in round
-2 brings (at most $14) brings at most the same payoﬀ as matching to the worst high-type choice
in round 0 (at least $14). Matching with the best high-type choice in round -1 can bring more
or less payoﬀ than matching with the worst high-type choice in round 0.
The net payoﬀ of an agent in the market is the utility she gets from being matched minus
the ￿early￿ contract cost if any. An unmatched agent gets utility 0, representing the prospect
facing the unmatched participants in the observed markets, which involves entering a secondary
after-market.
3.2 The Mixed Game Design
The centralized matching markets employed after the decentralized era in Britain motivate the
mixed games. A mixed game also has three periods. In rounds -2 and -1, each ￿rm has the
option to make an oﬀer to at most one worker of its own choice, and each worker has the option
to accept at most one of those oﬀers. An early contract is costly. A centralized market, where
the agents submit rank-order lists, replaces round 0. These lists are processed by a centralized
mechanism for matches.
In each game early matches are interpreted as a commitment by the parties to list each other
in the ￿rst place of their rank-order lists of round 0 (i.e., they arrange for a (1,1) match).12
Arranging agents are free to ￿ll in the rest of their rank-order lists in any way they wish. The
costs of contracts are set as $2 in round -2, $1 in round -1 and $0 in round 0. A cost is charged
only if the early contract is successful and is realized as a match in round 0. Under the linear
programming mechanism, as noted earlier (1,1) matches are not always achieved.
In the mixed games with the priority matching mechanism and the Gale-Shapley mechanism,
(1,1) matches are always achieved, so early contracts are binding. Agents who make an early
contract are matched with each other and they do not participate in the experiment￿s centralized
matching round.
The information structure is private throughout the play of the games. No other agent can
observe an arrangement between a ￿rm and a worker in rounds -2 and -1. All other oﬀers made
by ￿rms, rejections of oﬀers, and the submitted rank-order lists are also private.
The net payoﬀ of an agent in the market is the utility she gets from being matched minus
the ￿early￿ contract cost if any.
12Because positions in the UK belong not to the consultants but to the health service, it was necessary for
consultants and interns to ￿ll out rank-order lists even if they had reached an early agreement.
93.3 Experimental Sessions
We consider three treatment groups in which mixed games use priority matching, Gale-Shapley,
and linear programming mechanisms, respectively. We conduct nine sessions total, three sessions
of each treatment. Subjects were recruited among inexperienced undergraduate students from
diﬀerent disciplines at the University of Pittsburgh and sessions were run at the Pittsburgh
Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL).
Each play of a game is called a market. Each experimental session consisted of 10 decentral-
ized markets followed by 15 mixed markets. At the beginning of the experiment, a computer
tutorial explained the objectives of the experiment and described the decentralized game to the
subjects. We gave written instructions and read them aloud during the tutorial session. After
the decentralized games were played, we used transparencies accompanied with written instruc-
tions to describe the mixed games to the subjects. We read the instructions aloud. For the
priority matching treatment and the Gale-Shapley treatment, the instructions explicitly stated
that (1,1) lists were certain to be realized as matches and therefore they did not need to ￿ll in
rank-order lists in round 0 if they made early contracts. For compatibility, we gave the subjects
explicit instructions that (1,1) lists were not guaranteed to be realized as a match under the
linear programming mechanism. The rest of the information about the centralized mechanisms
was similar to the information given to the interns in the ￿eld.13
There were 12 subjects in each session: 3 high-type ￿rms, 3 low-type ￿rms, 3 high-type
workers, and 3 low-type workers. The subjects retained their identity as ￿rm or worker and
their productivity type throughout the session. To keep the identities of the subjects private
and to prevent repeated game eﬀects, we generated random ID numbers in each market. At the
end of each market, the matches were announced: the players observed the productivity types
of the agents involved in the matches and the round that each match occurred. Easy visibility
of instabilities is a feature of the British markets, so in the experiment interns and consultants
know the outcome of the match of the previous year before participating in the current year￿s
match.
Each subject was paid an $8 participation fee plus the payoﬀ s h ea c h i e v e di no n eo ft h e
plays of the decentralized game (maximum $16) and the payoﬀ achieved in one of the plays of
the mixed game (maximum $16). Thus subjects could earn payoﬀs between $8 and $40. The
average was close to $20. The results of these payment games were determined randomly at the
end of the sessions.
13The intstructions and preference pro￿l e su s e da r eg i v e ni nA p p e n d i c e sBa n dC , l o c a t e da t
http://home.ku.edu.tr/~uunver/research/survivalappendix.pdf.
104 Analysis of the Results
4.1 Cost of Unraveling in the Laboratory and in the Simulations
To measure the total level of unraveling of contracts via early matches, we de￿ne cost of unrav-
eling as the actual total cost of all ￿successful￿ early contracts in a matching market: the sum
of all $1 and $2 fees collected for early matches after each matching game is over.
We report the results in groups of ￿ve consecutive markets (i.e., we use average results for
each set of 5 markets) called blocks. We take the averages of the last ￿ve or the ￿rst ￿ve markets
as a single datum to represent each cohort. Therefore we have a low sample size. We use
parametric t-tests to analyze the data. Because of the small sample size (3 in most cases),w e
use α =0 .1 as the signi￿cance level for the tests. Data are analyzed using ￿one-sided￿ paired or
two-sample tests unless otherwise noted. The degrees of freedom denoted by d.f. tells whether
the test is a two-sample or a paired one. For example, d.f.=2 or 8 refers to a paired test and
d.f.=4 or 16 refers to a two-sample test. Our main ￿nding about the costs of unraveling is stated
as follows:
Result 1. When the unraveling costs are considered, the Gale-Shapley market performs better
in decreasing costs of unraveling of the decentralized markets than both the priority matching
and the linear programming markets, which perform equally badly. High types are mostly
responsible for early matching in all treatments.
In the remainder of this subsection, we discuss the data supporting Result 1. Figure 1a
is a graph of the cost of unraveling versus matching markets in the laboratory. The ￿rst 10
markets use the decentralized game design (denoted by ￿Decentralized￿ in the graph) and the
next 15 markets use one of the mixed games (denoted by ￿Mixed￿ in the graph). In these
graphs and all of the others, the horizontal axis refers to the market blocks, and the vertical
axis refers to the average of the quantity in question. In the last block, the cost in the Gale-
Shapley market is signi￿cantly less than the cost in the priority matching market and the linear
programming market. When compared with the last block of the Gale-Shapley market, for
the priority matching market the diﬀerence in cost is $1.77, which has p=0.08920, and for the
linear programming market the diﬀerence in cost is $0.97, which has p=0.09466 (both in t-
tests with d.f.=4). Note that in the last block, the linear programming market cost and the
priority matching market cost are not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from each other, although the linear
programming market cost seems less.
At the disaggregated level, the high types are more responsible for early matching than the
low types. For the linear programming market, the diﬀerence between the unraveling cost for
the high types and the low types is $1.2 per session with p=0.06223; for the priority matching


















































































































Figure 1: Cost of unraveling in the laboratory (Graphs A-C) and in the short-run (Graphs D-F)
and long-run simulations (Graph G). The ￿rst two blocks of markets in graphs A-F (10 markets
in total) are under the decentralized game and the last three blocks in graphs A-F (15 markets in
total) are under the mixed game using one of the mechanisms in the legend of the ￿gure. In the
legend, LP refers to the linear programming treatment, priority refers to the priority matching
treatment, and GS refers to the Gale-Shapley treatment.
12diﬀerence is $1.31 with p=0.09551 (all are obtained as results of t-tests with d.f.=2). For the
overall decentralized market the diﬀerence is $3.2 with p=0.0002443 (as the result of a t-test
with d.f.=8). Figure 1b and Figure 1c summarize these results. Therefore, the high types are
responsible for most of the decrease in early contracts in the transition from the decentralized
design to the mixed design.14
We try to explain the behavior observed in the experiment with an arti￿cial-agent-based
learning model. We use as the learning model a computational algorithm called a genetic
algorithm (Holland 1975). The method used is similar to the ￿nver (2001) study. In this study,
we include only some simulation results for comparison. One major diﬀerence between the
current simulation and the ones in ￿nver 2001 is the length and duration of each treatment.
Here each arti￿cial treatment lasts as long as an experimental treatment, 25 markets. In ￿nver
2001, we were mostly interested in the long-run adjustments.15
In terms of the unraveling costs in the arti￿cial agent markets, the deferred acceptance
market performs better than the linear programming market, which in turn leads to lower
early matching costs than the priority matching markets. This can be observed in Figure 1d.
Computationally, the mixed markets cause lower costs than the decentralized markets (mixed
markets cause $2.60 per market on average, and decentralized markets cause on average $6.42
per market, for a diﬀerence of $3.82). Note that the simulations re￿ect an average of 30 sessions
for each treatment, whereas the experimental results re￿ect averages of 3 sessions for each
treatment. Since the diﬀerences in the simulations are mostly signi￿cant we do not report their
t-test analyses.
4.1.1 Long-Run Simulation Dynamics
In this subsection, we extend the length of the social learning simulations to create a meaningful
comparison with the ￿nver (2001) study, which predicted that the linear programming mecha-
nisms should be very successful in preventing early contracts contrary to the experimental and
short-run simulation ￿ndings. Now, we use the simulation results in the long run (i.e., for dura-
14If we inspect number of early contracts as an alternative measure of unraveling, the results do not change
extensively. The number of contracts made by high types is signi￿cantly larger than that of low types in round
-1. In round -1, for the linear programming mixed markets the diﬀerence is 0.82 with p=0.01797; for the priority
mixed markets the diﬀerence is 0.96 with p=0.05976; and for the Gale-Shapley mixed markets the diﬀerence is
0.54 with p=0.1060 (all results are obtained in t-tests with d.f.=2). In round -2, there is a signi￿cant diﬀerence
between high- and low-type agent contracts only in the mixed Gale-Shapley markets and in the decentralized
markets. Low-type agents virtually stop matching early in transition from the last ￿ve decentralized markets
to the ￿rst ￿ve mixed markets; this is signi￿cant only for the priority matching treatment with p=0.03414 (in a
t-test with d.f.=2).
15The details of these simulations are given in Appendix A, located at
http://home.ku.edu.tr/~uunver/research/survivalappendix.pdf.
13tions longer than can physically be studied in the laboratory) as in ￿nver 2001 methodology. We
use the same parameters as the short-run simulations reported above, and the same preference
pro￿les as the experiment. We hold 40 decentralized markets followed by 120 mixed markets.
The costs of unraveling are shown in Figure 1g. As can be clearly seen, the Gale-Shapley mech-
anism and the linear programming mechanism are successful in the long run in preventing costs,
while the priority mechanism performs relatively more poorly. In the last 40 matching markets
(from 121 to 160), the Gale-Shapley and the linear programming mixed market costs are lower
than the priority mixed market costs. We see a -$1.17 diﬀerence between the linear programming
and the priority matching mixed markets and a -$1.22 diﬀerence between the Gale-Shapley and
the priority matching mixed markets. The unraveling cost in the deferred acceptance and the
linear programming markets are comparable to each other in the last 40 mixed generations, with
an o n - s i g n i ￿cant diﬀerence of -$0.04533 with p=0.4008 (as the result of a two-sided t-test with
d.f.=58). These ￿ndings are consistent with the ￿ndings of ￿nver (2001).
4.2 Other Characteristics of the Experiment
This subsection is related to the experimental results. We analyze whether agents manipulate
their rank-order lists in round 0 of the mixed games, how stable the ￿nal matching is, and how
many agents are unmatched in general. Our main ￿nding in this subsection is stated as follows:
Result 2. Comparable numbers of agents remain unmatched in the mixed markets; however,
the linear programming market leads to more mismatches between agent types than the other
mixed markets. This is a result of the nature of the linear programming mechanism and its eﬀects
are in￿ated by low agents of the linear programming markets truncating their rank-order-lists
more aggressively than the low agents in the other mixed markets.
In the remainder of this subsection, we explain the data supporting Result 2. As seen in
Table 1, agents do not usually submit full lists in round 0 of the mixed games. The low-type
agents submit longer lists than the high-type agents: there is a 1.0025 agent diﬀerence with
p=0.01108 in the Gale-Shapley markets, a 0.5333 agent diﬀerence with p=0.01181 in the linear
programming markets, and a 0.8656 agent diﬀerence with p=0.005240 in the priority markets
for the last two blocks (using t-tests with d.f.=2).
Table 1. Laboratory Experiment: Average Length of Rank-Order Lists in Round 0 of Mixed Markets















14The high-type agent rank-order lists have comparable lengths under all treatments: we observe
an insigni￿cant p=0.4004 for a comparison between the Gale-Shapley market and the priority
markets, an insigni￿cant p=0.2826 for a comparison between the Gale-Shapley market and the
linear programming market, and again an insigni￿cant p=0.7747 for a comparison between the
linear programming market and the priority market, using averages in the last two blocks (using
a two-sided test with d.f.=4).
The shorter lists of the high-type agents re￿ect their eﬀort to avoid mismatches with the
low types. A low-type agent has the highest opportunity for a mismatch to a high-type agent
under the linear programming scheme by the nature of the linear programming mechanism. By
omitting some low-type agents from her rank-order list, a low-type agent increases her chances
to be matched with a high-type agent (the linear programming mechanism algorithm avoids
leaving agents unmatched as much as possible). This can be the underlying reason that the
linear programming low-type agent lists are the shortest among the low types: for the rank-
order list length of low-type agents in the linear programming market, we see a diﬀerence of -0.4
agents from the priority market with a signi￿cant p=0.007900, and a -0.8335 agent diﬀerence
from the Gale-Shapley market with a signi￿cant p=0.0008552 for averages obtained in the last
two blocks (using t-tests with d.f.=4).
Below we analyze characteristics of the market matching such as its eﬃciency for the un-
matched agents and its ex-post stability.
The number of mismatched agents is de￿ned as the number of agents who are matched with
types diﬀerent from their own. Similarly, we de￿ne the number of unmatched agents to measure
how many agents are not matched in a market. The latter measures ineﬃciency in the Pareto
sense.
As seen in Table 2, the centralized mechanisms decrease the number of unmatched agents
below the decentralized market level: for the linear programming treatment we have a highly
signi￿cant p=0.00003470, for the priority treatment we have a highly signi￿cant p=0.00010728,
and for the Gale-Shapley treatment we have a highly signi￿cant p=0.00002029 using averages
of the last two blocks when each design is compared with its decentralized design (using t-tests
with d.f.=2). Since the opportunity to submit a rank-order list can be interpreted as each
agent making as many as 6 oﬀers, the mixed games have an advantage over the decentralized
game where each ￿rm extends at most 1 oﬀer. This is one of the factors driving the high
number of early contracts in the decentralized market as well. Although the priority treatment
causes slightly more agents to stay unmatched (with an insigni￿cant diﬀerence), we observe a
15comparable number of unmatched agents in each mixed treatment.
Table 2. Laboratory Experiment: Characteristics of the Market Matching






























We also see in Table 2 that the decentralized market does not cause a substantial amount of
mismatches between high types and low types. We observe a substantial amount, 3.4 mismatched
agents on average, in the last ten linear programming mixed markets, which is much greater
than the other treatments: for the linear programming treatment, when compared with the
priority treatment we have a signi￿cant p=0.01487 (with d.f.=4), when compared with the
Gale-Shapley treatment, we have a signi￿cant p=0.007618 (with d.f.=4), and when compared
with the decentralized design, we have a signi￿cant p=0.0001227 (with d.f.=2) for averages in
the last two blocks. We think that this is a result of the nature of the linear programming
mechanism, where mismatched pairings can bring an optimal matching (especially when the low
agents submit truncated lists and the high agents occasionally continue listing the low types).
The priority mechanism causes fewer mismatched pairs than the linear programming mechanism.
If everyone had played non-strategically and submitted truthful lists, the mixed markets would
have led on average to 2 mismatched agents under the priority mechanism and 3.2 mismatched
agents under the linear programming treatment. The high types cut down on mismatches by
achieving early contracts in the priority treatment. However, even with early contracts the
high types cannot cut down on mismatches in the linear programming treatment. We think
that this last point is one of the main reasons why the number of early contracts in the linear
programming treatment is not greater than it is in the priority treatment. We observe only very
few mismatched agents in the Gale-Shapley treatment (see Table 2).16
16Kagel and Roth￿s (1990) experiment adopts priority and Gale-Shapley matching mechanisms. There are two
diﬀerences that we observe between the results of this study for the priority and Gale-Shapley treatments and the
Kagel and Roth (2000) study. The ￿rst diﬀerence concerns the magnitude of unraveling costs under the priority
matching treatment and the second concerns the way that the early matching is prevented under the Gale-Shapley
treatment. Since our preference pro￿les have fewer mismatched agents than theirs under the priority treatment,
the level of early matching settles to a slightly lower level than in their ￿ndings. Moreover, under the Gale-Shapley
treatment in our experiment, high-type ￿rms ￿rst stop to make early oﬀe r sa so p p o s e dt ot h e i r￿ndings. Besides
these two minor details, ￿ndings of this study and the Kagel and Roth study suggest a robust phenomenon in
regards to the unraveling potential of the priority matching markets.
165C o n c l u s i o n s
We found no result that would suggest that the ￿eld success of the unstable linear programming
mechanisms in the short run should be attributed to intrinsic game theoretical properties of the
mechanism. Our ￿ndings are robust, since we observe that they are consistent with the Kagel
and Roth (2000) and the ￿nver (2001) ￿ndings.
We conclude that Roth￿s (1991) explanation for the success of the linear programming mech-
anisms (even in the short run) still needs to be tested in the laboratory. A future research
agenda may require an experimental design using the market culture of these speci￿cm a r k e t s
in determining why the linear programming mechanisms have survived. We currently reject the
hypothesis that the features of the market related to the mechanism characteristics as the reason
for its success.
References
[1] Chen Y and S￿nmez T (2002) Improving Eﬃciency of On-Campus Housing: An Experi-
mental Study. Amer Econ Rev 92: 1669-1686.
[2] Chen Y and S￿nmez T (2003) School Choice: An Experimental Study. Working paper.
[3] Ehlers L (2002) In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets. Working
paper.
[4] Gale D and Shapley LS (1962) College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. Am Math
Mo 69: 9-15.
[5] Haruvy E, Roth AE and ￿nver MU (2001) The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An
Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market.
Working paper.
[6] Holland JH (1975) Adaptation in Natural and Arti￿cial Systems. The University of Michi-
gan Press, Ann-Arbor, MI.
[7] Kagel JH and Roth AE (2000) The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A
Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment. Quart J Econ 115: 201-235.
[8] Kesten O (2003) On Three Kinds of Manipulation in Two-Sided Matching Markets. Working
paper.
[9] Li H and Rosen S (1998) Unraveling in Matching Markets. Amer Econ Rev 88: 371-87.
17[10] McKinney CN, Niederle M, and Roth AE (2002) The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clear-
inghouse (and Why Such Failures are Rare). Working paper.
[11] Mongell S and Roth AE (1991) Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism Amer
Econ Rev 81: 441-464.
[12] Niederle M and Roth AE (2003) Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Oﬀers
Aﬀect Market Performance. Working paper.
[13] Niederle M, Roth AE and ￿nver MU (2004) Unraveling Results from Comparable Supply
and Demand. Working paper in preparation.
[14] Roth AE (1991) A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets:
Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom. Amer Econ
Rev 81: 415-440.
[15] Roth AE and Sotomayor M (1990) Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game Theoretic
Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[16] Roth AE and Xing X (1994) Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to
the Timing of Market Transactions. Amer Econ Rev 84: 992-1044.
[17] S￿nmez T (1999) Can Pre-Arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?
J Econ Theory 86: 148-156.
[18] ￿nver MU (2001) Backward Unraveling over Time: The Evolution of Strategic Behavior in
the Entry-Level British Medical Labor Markets. J Econ Dynam Control 25: 1039-1080.
18